Now, one of the best things about Thucydides is that he precedes our neat division of the world into academic specialties — history, international relations, political theory, etc. The translation of Thucydides into the idiom of contemporary political science is especially tricky. Here, the work of the political scientist Ned Lebow on Thucydides deserves honorable mention. Not exactly. I do think that he is making a useful distinction between proximate and deeper causes — i.
The story is as much about Athenian and Spartan perceptions of their interests as it is about systemic alterations in the balance of power. I maintain that Thucydides does not mean inevitability as efficient causation, or in any sense that suggests that the forces involved are fully external to the actors.
Instead, I argue that the objective inevitability of a Peloponnesian War is in fact the product the subjective views of the actors themselves, rooted in the deeply opposing characters of Athens and Sparta, or in the ways that the cities differently privilege security, honor, and profit. To abridge a complicated story, what Thucydides means by necessity is perhaps best understood as the imperatives of the national interest, as the actor in question understands those interests, while these interests are themselves conditioned by overarching world views or disparate cultural outlooks.
This does not mean that they were correct to arrive at that decision, or that there were no alternatives to war. Instead, Thucydides illuminates the interactive chain of events by which the protagonists themselves became locked into path dependencies, firmly convinced of the reasonableness of their actions or policies, which, in fatal combination with one another, led to a mutually destructive war.
Are there lessons here for the United States and China? I think there are. Allison is surely right to maintain that structural stresses associated with the balance of power will test the U. He is also correct that this dynamic will be of vital importance for global order in the 21st Century, and that policy-makers would do well to be alive to the clear and present danger of miscalculation, or of the unintended escalation of minor conflicts. The United States and China all too easily risk becoming locked into dangerous path dependencies, rooted in opposing U.
But, of course, no Thucydides will solve our problems for us. The History reveals the characteristic ways that human beings succeed, or more often than not fail, to respond to the exigencies of their circumstances, for error, unfortunately, predominates over sensible judgment in human affairs. Insofar as Graham Allison is exhorting the United States and China to avoid gratuitous strategic errors, his advice, I would suggest, is soundly Thucydidean.
Decision-makers in both countries would do well to heed him. For what is lost by caution — or, to use a favored Greek term, moderation — and a corresponding aliveness to the danger of clashing interests in the shadow of broader shifts in the balance of power? He is more cautious. In 12 of these, he says, war resulted and in four it did not. Moreover, his goal is not really to make a prediction.
And yet the risk of misunderstanding Thucydides remains when he is used this way, however carefully. But Thucydides never describes the complex strategic history of his time as any kind of paradigm or trap. He never warns that this set of circumstances may occur again and that we all must be on guard for it in the future.
To use his history as if he did risks turning it into a kind of parlor game of potentially predictive analogies. No, Athens is 21 st century America!
No, Sparta is! We better watch out — look what happened in the Peloponnesian War! So how should we use Thucydides, then? Does his history have anything valuable to offer modern thinkers or policymakers?
It certainly does, and this brings me to my second point. Years of working with Thucydides in the classroom and as a scholar tell me that what his book teaches most of all is what we might call historical mindfulness. By this I mean a generalized understanding about the workings of history: what kinds of forces tend to inspire people, drive politics, create crises and bring or prevent resolution, with what consequences for human communities?
Thucydides was not a prophet nor a political scientist, but a keen observer and explicator of the human condition in collective conflict. And we can gain much wisdom by studying his work with this in mind. The horror and tragedy of the events in Corcyra — friends become enemies, kin kill kin, a once-prosperous polity virtually self-destructs —make his account riveting and give weight to his thoughts on how such things can come about.
Several of his observations stand out: that the existence of a larger war between Athens and Sparta paved the way for Corcyra and, later, other polarized cities to fall into internal violence; that political behavior previously honored as prudent and honest becomes, in these circumstances, scorned as disloyal or cowardly; that atrocity led to counter-atrocity, while mutual distrust made de-escalation almost impossible.
It helps make us historically mindful. This manner of reading Thucydides offers, I would assert, a deeper wisdom than analogy-hunting.
Recent scholarship has highlighted this dimension of his work. Even though the main focus in his History remains on warfare and the geo-political deliberations that inform it, there is more on human nature and culture in this work than one may think. And, more frequently than not, Thucydides extends his sharp analysis from politics and warfare to the human and cultural factors driving human history. The same sharp analysis runs throughout the work.
The Mytilenean Debate revolves around whether the Athenians should revoke their decision to annihilate the entire western Ionian city of Mytilene in retaliation for a revolt. Thucydides has two main speakers set out the case.
Both speakers make a series of complex arguments revolving around questions of justice, fairness, good governance, and the nature of hegemonic rule. Cleon a General during the Peloponnesian War argues for harsh treatment: doing otherwise would set a dangerous precedent for other allies. Diodotus his opponent , on the other hand, takes up this point and insists that a more lenient response is the superior strategy: it would not corner those rebelling but provides them with a viable alternative that secures a future source of revenue for Athens.
As such, the Athenians choose to overturn the decision. A trireme is dispatched just in time to prevent major bloodshed. However, a very different side of Athens emerges in the Melian Dialogue. Importantly, this conceit allowed both the Athenians and the Melians to present their views directly and as a collective voice.
Should the Melians a Spartan colony be allowed to remain neutral? Or should the Athenians insist they submit and pay tribute? The Melians make a passionate plea for justice and the right to remain neutral. The Athenians counter by pointing out:. Allowing the Melians to remain neutral would set a dangerous precedent and threaten Athenian hegemony. Over two millennia later, this line of reasoning still resonates. Particularly now, as populism reemerges, insights into the power of words to influence public sentiments and decision-making remain acutely and painfully up-to-date.
In his book of the same name, he describes the constant struggle of nation states to maintain and optimise power and hegemony in order to prevent other states from dominating them. And a tragedy it is. Both the Athenians and the Melians remain steadfast. Melos an Aegean island inhabited by Dorians refuses to submit.
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