In doing so over the years, these TCOs have become increasingly wealthy and powerful throughout the Western Hemisphere — so much so that in some regions of Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America , they compete well for primacy with governments. Coast Guard. In Latin America, the TCOs often resort to extraordinary violence to address challenges by rivals, compel behavior of the local populace, and resist attempts by the local government to check their actions.
This violence severely destabilizes the entire hemisphere. Closer to home, TCO violence is a significant contributor to the out-migration that has driven the consistently large numbers of migrants arriving at the United States southern border.
Indeed, from October to December , U. Customs and Border Protection CBP and its Border Patrol interdicted an average of 72, migrants at the southwest border , which translates to 1. Most come from the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, although of late, relatively large numbers of Mexican nationals are being interdicted trying to cross the U.
The illegal drug trade provides a vast source of funding for the TCOs. But trafficking in illegal narcotics provides the bulk of funding. Leaving aside for a moment the increased border control measures associated with the COVID pandemic , this trafficking typically occurs across two main vectors: the land border and the maritime border. CBP, principally its Office of Field Operations, is the lead agency for United States border security issues, both at and between the ports of entry.
In Fiscal Year , CBP seized over 42, pounds of cocaine, 5, pounds of heroin, , pounds of marijuana, , pounds of methamphetamine, and 3, pounds of fentanyl. The fentanyl seizures, while the smallest in total, are perhaps the most troubling given the deadly potency of that particular drug.
Moreover, fentanyl seizures have consistently increased in size over the last five years, and recent reports indicate huge increases of fentanyl seized by Mexican authorities on their side of the border. In addition to moving illicit drugs across water or open areas of the land border without manmade barriers, the addition or enhancement of border barriers could lead some smugglers to move their contraband through POEs.
The most recent data from CBP indicate that, in pounds, more illicit drugs—specifically marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and fentanyl—are already being moved through POEs than between them. A question policymakers may ask is what effect, if any, increased miles or enhanced styles of border barriers may have on drug smuggling between the POEs.
Specifically, they may question whether additional border barrier construction will substantially alter drug smugglers' routes, tactics, speed, or abilities to breach these barriers and bring contraband into the country. Without this baseline, analysts, enforcement officials, and policymakers rely on other data, albeit selected or incomplete, to help inform whether or how border barriers may affect illicit drug smuggling.
At the top of the illicit drug supply chain is the total production of illicit drugs around the world—both plant-based e. Although some illicit drugs are produced in the United States, many originate elsewhere and are smuggled into the country. For plant-based drugs, a variety of factors affect cultivation as well as surveillance and measurement of crop yields. In addition, not all illicit drug crops may be processed into illicit drugs.
For synthetic drugs, the supply chain begins in chemical manufacturing and pharmaceutical facilities. Measuring the stock of these drugs is affected by issues including the availability and inconsistent regulation of precursor chemicals and the proliferation of synthetic analogues, or new psychoactive substances.
The next step in the supply chain of illicit drugs produced abroad and destined for the United States is their transit toward and into the country. Of the unknown total amount of illicit drugs produced, some may be consumed in the country of production, some may be destined for the United States, and some may be intended for an alternate market.
Of those drugs destined for the United States, some may become degraded or lost in transit, some may be seized by law enforcement or otherwise destroyed or jettisoned by traffickers pursued by enforcement officials, and some reach the U. Of the total amount of illicit drugs that reach the U. Border barriers are only one component of tactical infrastructure employed at the border. Isolating the potential effects of changes in border barriers from those of other infrastructure investments, as well as from the effects of changes in technology and personnel, is a very difficult task.
The Department of Homeland Security DHS has made efforts to estimate the effectiveness of border security on the Southwest border between POEs; however, the department recognizes inevitable shortcomings of these estimates due, in part, to unknown flows of people and goods.
Further, its estimates of border security effectiveness do not make precise attributions of effectiveness to personnel, technology, or infrastructure—or even more specifically, the portion of infrastructure that is border barriers. There are also factors beyond the immediate personnel, technology, and infrastructure of border security efforts that may affect drug smuggling.
These include "the demand and supply for drugs, the type of drug being shipped, terrain and climate conditions, and smuggler counterintelligence functions. Moreover, changes in drug smuggling cannot always be directly linked to changes in border security efforts.
Policymakers may continue to question how DHS is identifying and evaluating any potential changes in drug smuggling between the POEs. More specifically, they may examine whether or how DHS is linking observed changes in drug seizure data—sometimes used as one proxy for drug smuggling—to specific border security efforts such as expanded border barriers. They may also consider how any return on investment in border barriers measured by effects on illicit drug seizures compares to the relative return from other border security enhancements.
Relatedly, policymakers may continue to examine how DHS defines "success" or "effectiveness" of border barriers in deterring or altering drug smuggling. For instance, is an effective barrier one that deters the smuggling of illicit drugs altogether, or might it be one that slows smugglers, changes their routes, or alters their techniques so that border officials have more time, opportunity, or ability to seize the contraband?
In addition, policymakers may question whether or how border barriers contribute to gathering intelligence that can be used by the broader drug-control community and whether that potential outcome is a measure of effectiveness. As soon as you hear those words, your blood pressure comes up a little bit, and you start to get excited.
We left it on board because these vessels are very unstable once you remove all the weight in them. While we were towing the vessel it took on water and sank. What's left for the crew - generally four people - is very cramped, maybe the size of a bed. No toilet or cooking facilities. They're also exposed to the diesel engines that operate these things.
It is an incredibly dangerous venture, besides the risk of being caught and prosecuted. They are clearly trying to develop a fully-submersible vessel, and that would be a game changer for us. Last month we interdicted a tunnel in San Diego and seized more than 10 tonnes of marijuana. It had lighting, a mechanism to circulate the air and a railway system so they could load the product in Mexico and run it down the rails to the exit point.
They used a pulley system to pull the narcotics up into the warehouse. We saw an exit point in the US where each time they came through the opening, they filled it with concrete, painted it and re-carpeted it. That's attention to detail.
We consider [the tunnels] a national security threat, and each time they complete one, our hope is that we identify it and take it out of business before it can be used. The rules have been extended until at least June 21, but Mexican authorities have allowed most U.
Law enforcement officials and drug trafficking experts say the border rules — put in place in April to curb the spread of the coronavirus — and their lopsided enforcement are driving the rise in U. Mexican traffickers, however, have long recruited Americans for the job. Customs and Border Protection data shows. In the and fiscal years, Americans were caught roughly twice as often as Mexicans. Both groups are exempt from the restrictions at U.
Despite early pandemic disruptions to the global drug trade, illegal substances have since been pouring into the U. Customs and Border Protection says narcotics seizures along the U. Most illegal drugs in the U.
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